Family Law: Parent and Child by Paulsen, James W.
SMU Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 20
1993
Family Law: Parent and Child
James W. Paulsen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 46 SMU L. Rev. 1515 (1993)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol46/iss4/20
FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
James W. Paulsen*
URING the past year, the Texas Supreme Court has issued opin-
ions on, or accepted for argument, at least eight cases dealing with
some aspect of the parent-child relationship. When one adds to this
several other community property and family law related opinions issued by
the state's high court during the last year, the total constitutes a hopeful sign
that Texas family law may be emerging from nearly a century of "second-
class citizenship,"' epitomized by the now-repealed ban on divorce, child
custody and child support jurisdiction.2 One well might hope, as Professor
Sampson puts it, that this trend will continue "until the backlog of unsolved
mysteries in our life's work is finally worked down."'3
I. STATUS
Paternity suits seem to be the "hot" family law issue of the 1990s, at least
so far as Texas Supreme Court action is concerned. Two paternity decisions
were handed down during the 1991-92 session, 4 and two more cases5 have
been accepted for argument in the current session. 6
Although Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan7 ultimately turned on plead-
ing issues, the case raised a fascinating paternity question. Willie and Crys-
tal Fleming divorced in 1986. While separated, but before the divorce,
Crystal had a child. In 1988, the state brought a suit to establish paternity
* B.F.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., Harvard Univer-
sity. Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Cris Browning, a second-year
law student at South Texas, assisted greatly in the preparation of this article.
1. John J. Sampson, A Brief Summary of the 1991-92 Texas Supreme Court Term: Fam-
ily Law Cases, 92-2 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 8 (1992).
2. When the Texas legislature created intermediate appellate courts in 1891, it made
their jurisdiction final, with certain exceptions, in divorce cases. See generally James P. Hart,
The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Texas, 29 TEX. L. REV. 285, 307-09 (1951).
This prohibition was removed in 1987. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225 historical note
(Vernon 1988).
3. Sampson, supra note 1, at 8.
4. Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992); Murdock v. Mur-
dock, 811 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1991). The Murdock decision was treated in last year's survey and
will not be revisited here. See Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, 45 Sw. L.J.
1873, 1875-76 (1992).
5. Gibson v. J.W.T., 815 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ granted);
Dreyer v. Greene, 809 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted). Both
Gibson and Dreyer are discussed in John D. Montgomery, Parenting in the 90's: Who's My
Legal Daddy? A Bedtime Story for the Future, 56 TEX. B.J. 20 (1993).
6. Applications for writ of error were granted in both cases on July 1, 1992, with oral
argument heard on December 1, 1992. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1005, 1007 (July 1, 1992).
7. 833 S.W.2d 952.
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under Chapter 13 of the Family Code, claiming that a third party, Willie
Lavan, was the real father. While the suit against Lavan was pending, the
Texas Legislature complicated the picture by amending the Family Code to
provide that a suit to establish paternity can be maintained only if the child
has no presumed father.8 Lavan moved for summary judgment, reasoning
that since the husband is presumed to be the father of any child born during
marriage, 9 the suit could not be maintained. 10 The situation was compli-
cated still further by the fact that the child had not been mentioned in the
divorce decree, giving rise to a claim by the putative father that the parties'
failure to contest paternity in the divorce foreclosed later action by the state.
The trial court and the court of appeals agreed with the alleged father.
The appeals court reasoned that the husband's paternity could be "disestab-
lished" only in a suit under Family Code section 12.06,11 which specifically
excludes Chapter 13 proceedings as an appropriate vehicle for disestablish-
ing paternity.12 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a Chap-
ter 12 suit could be combined in the same action with a Chapter 13
proceeding,' 3 and that, read liberally, the state's pleadings could be viewed
as including a Chapter 12 suit to disestablish the husband's presumed pater-
nity. 14 This ruling undoubtedly came as a surprise to the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, whose representatives had argued in the Texas Supreme Court
that they had not in fact intended to plead a Chapter 12 proceeding.'5
Whether Lavan sets a new standard for the Texas rule requiring liberal con-
struction of pleadings 16 or not, the result is unobjectionable: Combining the
8. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
9. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
10. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 953.
11. State of Texas v. Lavan, 802 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990), rev'd, 833
S.W.2d 952 (1992).
12. In relevant part, section 12.06(a) reads as follows:
In any suit affecting the parent-child relationship, other than a suit under Chap-
ter 13 ofthis Code, a husband or wife is entitled to deny the husband's paternity
of the child.... The question of paternity under this section must be raised by
an express statement denying paternity of the child in the spouse's pleadings in
the suit ....
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
13. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 954.
14. Id. The Texas Supreme Court's emphasis on pleading has already been given effect by
at least one court. See In the Interest of B.I.V., 843 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992), on reh'g, No. 13-91-080-CV, 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 2939 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi,
Nov. 6, 1992 n.w.h.). In B.. V., the Corpus Christi court initially followed the court of ap-
peals' ruling in Lavan. After the Texas Supreme Court's decision issued, the court denied a
motion for rehearing with a further opinion noting that no Chapter 12 complaint was alleged.
15. In briefing, for example, the Attorney General's office stated specifically that "[t]he
attorney general is not a 'husband or wife' and does not seek to rebut the presumed paternity
of Willie Flemings pursuant to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon Supp. 1993), but to
prove his non-paternity as an element in establishing the paternity of Willie Lavan." Peti-
tioner's Application for Writ of Error at 15, Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d
952 (1992).
16. Cf TEX. R. Civ. P. 45(d) ("All pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantialjustice."). In the spirit of this rule, Texas courts typically do read pleadings liberally. See, e.g.,
Ron Craft Chevrolet, Inc. v. Davis, 836 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ




two actions in one proceeding conserves judicial resources and, as the court
put it, "advances the best interests of the child by eliminating any period of
time a child would be left without the benefit of a legal father."
' 17
In Lavan, the Supreme Court of Texas dealt in summary fashion with the
claim that only the husband or wife had standing to challenge the husband's
paternity. While section 12.06 does state that a "husband or wife" is entitled
to challenge the husband's paternity, and refers to "the spouse's" plead-
ings,18 the court concluded that "[w]e . . .find nothing in the Code that
expressly prohibits the State from bringing a claim under chapter 12,"'19 at
least in the absence of a proper objection on the point.20 Once the court
decided that the State of Texas could bring a claim to disestablish paternity,
the question whether the prior divorce decree barred the State's action was
answered easily. The court pointed to statutory authority authorizing "any
governmental entity" to bring suit "at any time" in suits affecting the parent-
child relationship. 2 The Supreme Court concluded that this gives the State
independent standing to challenge paternity, and that since it was not a
party to the divorce decree, the decree had no binding effect on a later
action. 22
Dreyer v. Greene,23 currently pending decision in the Supreme Court of
Texas, raises another standing issue in paternity suits. In Dreyer, the divorce
decree adjudged the husband to be the father of three children, the youngest
of whom were twins.24 After some difficulties in collecting child support, in
which the mother again affirmed that her ex-husband was the twins' fa-
ther, 25 a deal was struck in which the ex-husband conveyed some land in
settlement of the child support issue.26 The land eventually proved to be
virtually valueless because of an undisclosed tax lien. 2 7 The mother then
sued Greene in her capacity as the childrens' next friend, claiming that
Greene was the twins' "real" father. Greene defended, arguing that the suit
was barred by the prior adjudication, and pointing to language in Family
Code section 13.44 barring a paternity suit if a prior final judgment has been
rendered "adjudicating a named individual to be the biological father of the
17. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 954.
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 954.
20. The opinion is not altogether clear on the question of whether the issue was raised
properly. The court noted that there were no special exceptions directed to the State's theory
of recovery and that "the record does not show that Lavan complained of the breadth of, or
any ambiguity in the State's pleadings." Id.
21. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
22. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 955.
23. 809 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1991, writ granted).
24. Id. at 263.
25. Id.
26. This fact does not appear in the court of appeals opinion. It is, however, found in the
Family Law Section newsletter's report on the case. 91-5 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 60-
61 (John Sampson ed. 1991). Since Professor Sampson, the newsletter's editor, is Greene's
counsel on appeal, the information can be presumed to be accurate. Possibly for the same




child .... ,"28 The trial court agreed with Greene and the court of appeals
affirmed. 29
Dreyer contains some interesting similarities to Lavan, as well as some
differences. One possible distinction between Dreyer and Lavan is the ques-
tion of whether paternity actually was "adjudicated." In Dreyer, the court
of appeals emphasized the fact that the twins were mentioned as children of
the marriage in a sworn divorce pleading and in a subsequent proceeding to
collect child support.30 In contrast, the child in Lavan was for some reason
not mentioned in the divorce proceeding. While not citing section 13.44 spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Lavan that "no order of the
court purported to adjudicate the child's paternity.'31 If this is a relevant
distinction, it would be a thin one. The omission of the child's name from
the Lavan pleadings is unexplained; the inclusion of the twins' names in the
Dreyer pleadings resulted in adjudication only in the most technical sense,
since judgment was rendered by default. 32
The Supreme Court of Texas' decision in Dreyer ought to be interesting, to
put it mildly. While, as the court of appeals noted, the parents are presumed
to represent the interests of the children in a divorce, 33 one might reasonably
question whether a child's rights can be pretermitted by a garden-variety
divorce action in which there is no separate representation of the child's
interests34 and in which the parties may well have interests that conflict with
those of the child.35 To cut off a child's rights in such a situation might
conceivably give rise to a problem of constitutional dimensions, and Mrs.
Dreyer so argued, although the court of appeals held that any such argu-
ment was waived by failure to raise the issue at trial. 36 Moreover, in R.M.H
v. Messick,37 the Fort Worth court of appeals has suggested that a child's
right to bring a paternity suit is not barred by a prior paternity suit filed and
abandoned by her mother. The court expressly declined to follow the rea-
soning of the court of appeals in Dreyer, instead using a "virtual representa-
tion" theory to decide that the child's rights were not adequately
represented, and a subsequent independent action not barred.3 8
28. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.44(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
29. Dreyer, 809 S.W.2d at 263, 264.
30. Id.
31. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 953.
32. Dreyer, 809 S.W.2d at 263.
33. Id. at 264.
34. The court of appeals noted that an attorney ad litem "may" be appointed to represent
the child's interests in a divorce, id. at 264 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(c) (Vernon
1986)), but that no attorney ad litem had been appointed in this case. Since this was a default
judgment, however, one might reasonably wonder how the trial court could have been ap-
prised of any possible problem or conflict of interest.
35. For example, if (as seems to be intimated) Kathleen Dreyer brought a paternity suit
against Phillip Greene only because her ex-husband "dried up" as a source of child support,
then it would seem equally reasonable to assume that she might have named her ex-husband as
the father because of an initial mistaken impression that, "real" father or not, he would be a
better source of child support. The child, however, might be interested in the truth.
36. Dreyer, 809 S.W.2d at 264.
37. 828 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
38. Id. at 225-26.
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In Gibson v. J. W T.,39 however, a case in which the Supreme Court of
Texas granted a writ of error the same day it decided Lavan and granted a
writ in Dreyer, a constitutional challenge on behalf of a putative father is
presented squarely. The facts in Gibson are only a minor variation on the
Lavan/Dreyer theme. Mr. and Mrs. "T" separated, pending divorce. Mrs.
T took up residence with Larry Gibson for several months, but then recon-
ciled with her husband. Some months later, J.W.T. was born. Gibson filed
suit to establish paternity. The trial court ordered blood tests, with subse-
quent testimony that, to a 99.41 percent certainty, Gibson was the biological
father. 4° This result was not altogether surprising, as Mr. T had a vasec-
tomy about ten years prior to J.W.T.'s birth.41 The apparent reason for the
trial court's dismissal of Gibson's action, and the focus of the appeal, was
Gibson's lack of standing.
Section 11.03 of the Family Code sets out the list of parties entitled to
bring a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 42 In Lavan, the fact that
governmental entities are mentioned in Section 11.03 was given some weight
in the decision.43 The fact that children are mentioned specifically in section
11.03 may also play some part in the ultimate resolution of Dreyer.44 Sec-
tion 11.03(a)(7), however, specifically excludes causes of action by a person
claiming to be a biological father unless there is no presumed father. 45 Since
Mr. T is the presumed father in this case, 46 Gibson's only hope was to argue
that this provision is unconstitutional. Unfortunately for his position, the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Michael H. v. Gerald D. ,47 a case the
court of appeals felt to be "directly on point,"' 48 that cutting off a biological
father's rights raises no due process problems. 49 Gibson therefore relied
upon the due process analogue in the Texas Constitution,50 despite the fact
that the clause is commonly construed with reference to its federal
counterpart. 5 '
The Beaumont court of appeals agreed with Gibson's contention, rejecting
39. 815 S.W.2d 863.
40. Id. at 864-65.
41. Id. at 865.
42. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993)(authorizing a suit to be
brought "at any time" by "the child (through a representative authorized by the court)").
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
47. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
48. Gibson, 815 S.W.2d at 863.
49. 491 U.S. at 129.
50. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,
property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disenfranchised, except by the due course
of the law of the land."). However, the application for writ of error in Gibson was also granted
on "open courts" and "equal rights" grounds, TEX. CONST. art I, §§ 13, 3a, indicating that
these issues also were raised at the court of appeals stage. See Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1008 (July 1,
1992).
51. Cf JAMES C. HARRINGTON, THE TEXAS BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY AND
LITIGATION MANUAL 102 (1987)("As a rule .... Texas courts have declined the opportunity




the United States Supreme Court's approach in Michael H. v. Gerald D. The
unanimous Beaumont court held that "the rights and privileges of
parenthood are indeed fundamental" 52 but rejected the United States
Supreme Court plurality's countervailing consideration of protecting the
"sanctity of the family" through measures designed to favor "historic" fam-
ily units.5 The language of the Beaumont court is unusually strong, criticiz-
ing the Supreme Court's "obviously strained analysis" 54 and concluding:
"Thank God the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal government no
power to impose upon this state its view of what constitutes wise economic
or social policy."55
On October 30, 1992, the Waco court of appeals entered the fray with its
decision in Henderson v. Wietzikoski.5 6 On similar facts, the Waco court
sided with Beaumont in holding Family Code section 11.03(a)(7) unconstitu-
tional on state due process grounds.5 7 The majority decision in Henderson,
however, also addressed constitutional issues skirted by the Beaumont court
in Gibson, whether the ban against paternity challenges by alleged natural
fathers when a child has a presumed father violates the "open courts" provi-
sion of the Texas Constitution 58 or the Texas Equal Rights Amendment. 59
The Waco court found that no open courts problem is presented 60 but that
the Family Code provision is a "gender-based distinction because only men
such as Henderson . . .are denied the right to bring a suit to establish the
parent-child relationship."' 61 Balancing the child and putative parent's
"right to know" against the public policy favoring stable marriages, the ma-
jority struck the balance in favor of the right to know and against the stat-
ute's constitutionality. 62 A vehement dissent by Chief Justice Thomas,
however, criticized both the Waco and Beaumont courts' result, concluding
that
[flor the first time in the history of Texas jurisprudence, and in absolute
derogation of the common law, a court recognizes the constitutional
right of an outsider to attack the sanctity of the marital family by estab-
lishing the illegitimacy of its children. Surely that cannot be a right
granted by the due-process clause of our state's constitution. 63
52. Gibson, 815 S.W.2d at 866.
53. Id. at 867 (citing Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 841 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Waco, 1992, n.w.h.).
57. Id. at 102.
58. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll courts shall be open,
and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law."
59. The Texas ERA, adopted in 1972, provides that "[e]quality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin" and is self-operative.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a.
60. The court reasoned that the Texas open courts provision applies only to deprivations
of established common law rights and that Henderson established no such right. Henderson,
841 S.W.2d at 105.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Henderson, 841 S.W.2d at 105.
63. Id. at 109 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Thomas also characterized the
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There is surely something to be said for both sides of the issue, and the
"point-counterpoint" discussion in the Family Law Section's newsletter
spells out some of the policy issues succinctly. David Gray, criticizing the
Beaumont court's ruling in Gibson, opines that "[k]eeping a family together
is tough enough without allowing a stranger to intervene with or without
paternal 'good cause.' "64 In response, Professor Sampson comments that
"the possibility also exists that the 'real husband' is but a convenience used
by the mother to divest the 'real father' of his parental rights ... In sum, in
these cases the search for justice may be so fact-specific as to defy rulemak-
ing."'65 In any event, the Supreme Court of Texas will have an opportunity
in Gibson to give some constitutional guidance on a question that could have
arisen in Lavan 66 and may or may not be faced in Dreyer.67
Finally, two recent court of appeals cases, also dealing with paternity
questions, deserve brief mention. In Espiricueta v. Vargas,68 the Austin
court of appeals held that a putative father could establish his paternity of a
deceased child, for the purpose of sharing in a personal injury recovery, de-
spite a recital in a divorce decree that the child was "born during the mar-
riage" of the mother and another man.69 The Austin court reasoned that
this somewhat equivocal language did not constitute a "decree establishing
paternity" so as to create res judicata problems. 70 Moreover, the fact that
the putative father apparently signed a birth certificate as the child's father
permitted the court to presume that he was the child's father,7' even though
this presumption could conflict with the presumption that the husband is the
father of any child born during marriage. 72 Espiricueta was cited with ap-
parent approval by the Texas Supreme Court in Lavan.73
In T. WE. v. K.M.E. ,74 a divorce and custody proceeding bridging the gap
between paternity and conservatorship issues, the mother claimed-and
Beaumont court's result as "bizarre," and commented: "Unfortunately, after thanking Provi-
dence that Texas can declare its own state policy, the Gibson court proceeds to ignore the
policy set by the Texas legislature, which protects the marital family from outsiders attacking
the legitimacy of children born to the marriage." Id. at 108.
64. 92-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 36, 37 (John Sampson ed. 1992).
65. Id.
66. The Attorney General's briefing in Lavan suggested that a decision on statutory
grounds, as did ultimately issue from the Supreme Court of Texas, would make "unnecessary
an analysis of the child's due process rights under the Texas Constitution, which would seem
at least as worthy of recognition as those of the biological father in Gibson .... Petitioner's
Post-Submission Brief at 7, Attorney General of Texas v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992).
67. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
68. 820 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
69. Id. at 19.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 20. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.02(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
72. In his comment on the case, David Gray points out some possible problems that could
arise when different statutory presumptions conflict. Professor Sampson replies: "The 1989
legislature added four additional presumptions of paternity to the longstanding presumption
applicable to the mother's husband .... The legislature also chose not to provide a rank order
for these presumptions, leaving trial courts the responsibility for resorting to logic if scientific
parentage testing fails." 92-1 STATE BAR. SEC. L. REP.-FAM. L. 38-39 (John J. Sampson ed.
1992).
73. See Lavan, 833 S.W.2d at 955.
74. 828 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
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proved through blood tests and other evidence-that a six-year-old child
was not her husband's, but the result of an extramarital relationship. The
San Antonio court of appeals rejected the husband's theories of estoppel and
equitable adoption, but found that he nonetheless had standing to seek ap-
pointment as managing conservator as a "person who has had actual posses-
sion and control of the child for at least six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition."'75 The court also took the occasion to opine that
the statutory scheme permitting a "psychological father" of long standing to
be placed at a disadvantage by an adulterous spouse in divorce, due to the
statutory preference for biological parents,76 "puts a dangerous weapon in
the legal arsenal of parents who are willing, during the stress of divorce liti-
gation, to sacrifice a child's best interests for their own personal reasons." 77
The decision concludes with a broad hint to future litigants to consider a
statute of limitations argument.78
II. CONSERVATORSHIP
The Texas Supreme Court has been nearly as active in the area of child
custody as it has in paternity matters recently, and has issued two decisions
during the past year. In Weirich v. Weirich,79 a jury awarded a mother al-
most $6,000,000 in damages from the father and paternal grandmother for
taking and hiding the children for almost seven years. The father did not
appeal.80 The court of appeals reversed, 8' holding that Texas does not rec-
ognize a common law cause of action for negligent interference with a family
relationship and that there was no evidence to support a verdict against the
grandmother under the Family Code.8 2 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
on the Family Code question, finding that there was some evidence that the
grandmother knew the children were subject to a court order. The court
thus did not reach the common law tort question.8 3 The court remanded the
issue to the court of appeals, however, to consider insufficiency of the evi-
dence points of error. A separate concurrence by Justice Doggett advocated
75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
76. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1993)(requiring that a parent
be appointed managing conservator unless it would "not be in the best interest of the child
because the appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional
development").
77. T WE., 828 S.W.2d at 809.
78. The court noted that "[a] statute of limitations for the denial of paternity would solve
many of these problems," and that a four-year residual statute might apply, but that the issue
was not raised in the trial court. Id. at 809-10.
79. 833 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1992).
80. The court of appeals noted that the father did not perfect an appeal because a tentative
settlement had been reached. Weirich v. Weirich, 796 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 833 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 192).
81. The decision was summarized in last year's survey. See Solender, supra note 4, at
1880.
82. The Texas Family Code provides a cause of action for interference with child custody
and provides joint and several liability for those who assist in this interference. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 36.02(a), (c) (Vernon 1986).
83. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d at 943.
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recognition of a common law cause of action.84
Smith v. State,85 a habeas corpus action arising out of a criminal prosecu-
tion for interference with child custody, deserves mention if for no reason
other than its unusual facts. In 1985, Charles Smith allegedly fled Texas
with his two young sons, in violation of a child custody order. During the
seven years that followed, he apparently lived with his sons in Brazil, Scot-
land, Switzerland, Greece and Turkey, moving whenever his ex-wife picked
up his trail, before finally settling down in Mexico.8 6 In December of 1991,
after the story aired on the television program Unsolved Mysteries, Smith
was located in Mexico City and deported to the United States for trial. 87 At
some time during this process, his ex-wife secured a $53 million judgment on
behalf of the children in a Harris County district court.
88
The record at Smith's bail proceeding was not clear. The trial judge, how-
ever, either set Smith's bail at $53 million or conditioned $20,000 in bail on
payment of the $53 million civil judgment.89 On appeal, the Houston court
of appeals [First District] held that, viewed either way, the bail determina-
tion was erroneous: If bail was set at $53 million, the amount was so clearly
excessive as to violate Texas law; if conditioned on payment of the civil judg-
ment, the trial court's ruling bore no rational relationship to the purposes of
bail, that is, insuring a defendant's attendance at trial.90 Since Smith's prior
record gave rise to some questions regarding the likelihood that he would
appear at trial, the appeals court reduced bail, but only to $125,000.91
In the Interest of S.A. V,92 the Texas Supreme Court took up a complex
and confusing jurisdictional question. A Minnesota couple divorced. The
parents were awarded joint custody of the children, with the mother as phys-
ical custodian. Some time later, the mother moved to Texas. The mother
moved to modify the Minnesota order in Texas; one day later, the father
moved to modify in Minnesota. 93 The two state courts ultimately issued
parallel orders on child support and visitation expenses. The Texas court,
however, also modified the original Minnesota order to award the mother
sole managing conservatorship and modified the father's visitation rights. A
bare majority of the Texas Supreme Court decided that the father had suffi-
cient "minimum contacts" with Texas-visiting his children and concur-
rently making employment inquiries-to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction
by a Texas court over child support and visitation matters. 94 The majority
84. Id. at 946 (Doggett, J., concurring).
85. 829 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd).




90. Id. at 887.
91. Id. at 887. Since Smith testified that he could raise only $400 to pay a bail bond
premium, however, this "victory" apparently had no practical effect. Id.
92. 837 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1992).
93. Id. at 82.
94. Id. at 86. A dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Hecht and joined by Chief Justice
Phillips and Justice Cornyn, argued that the majority's ruling might discourage parents from
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also interpreted a Minnesota district court ruling, to the effect that "[t]his
Court will decline to exercise its jurisdiction over child custody and visita-
tion if Texas insists on exercising jurisdiction pursuant to an appellate court
decision," 95 as falling within the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act's proviso that a court of one state can modify a custody determination
from another state if the first state "has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction. '96
In Phillips v. Phillips, 97 the Houston court of appeals (14th District), also
concluded that a father, originally from Mississippi but residing in Kenya,
had sufficient contacts with Texas to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction to
enforce child support payments pending divorce. The mother, who was
originally from Houston, took the children from Kenya to Houston for a
three-week visit and never returned. The father's contacts with Texas con-
sisted only of eight visits during courtship and marriage. 98 Nonetheless,
since the father had no recent significant contacts with Mississippi or any
other state, and it would be no more burdensome for him to defend the suit
in Texas than elsewhere, the court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction.99
In the Interest of Carpenter'0 presents an uncommon variation on the
jurisdiction theme. After a Pennsylvania divorce, the husband absconded
with the child, settling in Crowell, Texas. The authorities eventually tracked
the father down and returned the child to his mother, who had since moved
to Arizona. The father then filed suit in Texas to modify the Pennsylvania
child custody order, arguing that Texas was the child's home state, since the
child had at that time lived in Texas for the preceding six months. The trial
court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed, ob-
serving that under the Texas Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Texas
was the child's home state' 0 ' but that a court should decline jurisdiction if
the petitioner has improperly removed the child from another's custody, un-
less the exercise of jurisdiction is in the child's best interests. 0 2 The father
argued that most evidence and witnesses to the child's welfare were in Texas
and that these are important UCCJA considerations. The father also raised
"open courts" and equal protection challenges. The court of appeals re-
jected these contentions, stating that the father "should not be allowed to use
his deliberate secretion of himself and [the child] as a claim or right .... To
do so would make a mockery of the purposes of the UCCJA."'0 3
visiting children. Id. at 89 (Hecht, J., dissenting). A separate dissent by Justice Gonzalez
echoed these concerns. Id. at 93-94 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
95. In the Interest of S.A. V., 837 S.W.2d at 88.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2)(1988).
97. 826 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
98. Id. at 748.
99. Id. at 750.
100. 835 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.52(5) (Vernon 1986)(defining "home state" as "the state
in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or
a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months").
102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.58(b) (Vernon 1986).
103. Cunningham, 835 S.W.2d at 761.
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Under Texas law, as amended in 1987, nonparents may be granted cus-
tody only if the court finds that appointment of either parent "would signifi-
cantly impair the child's physical health or emotional development.'104 In
Landry v. Nauls'0 5 the Houston court of appeals [Fourteenth District], in a
case of first impression, 106 reversed an award of custody to a grandparent,
observing that this statutory language sets a higher burden of proof than did
previous law' 07 and that fact findings tracking the statutory language would
be required.' 08 In addition, the court opined, an award of custody to a
grandparent is not proper when the grandparent is not a party to the ac-
tion. 10 9 By contrast, in May v. May, " 10 an award of custody to the maternal
grandfather was affirmed on appeal, when the evidence showed that the fa-
ther had once sold drugs from his home. III
Prause v. Wilder,"12 from the Texarkana court of appeals, addresses an
interesting visitation question. The father moved to modify a restrictive visi-
tation order to bring visitation up to the "standard" level presumed by the
Family Code to be reasonable and in the child's best interests."13 The trial
court declined to modify the order and the appeals court affirmed. The ma-
jority reasoned that, since the father "did not prove evidence [sic] that the
current visitation order is unworkable or that a change would be in the best
interest of the child," ' 1 4 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declin-
ing to modify the order. A better-reasoned' 5 concurrence concluded that,
since the father was requesting only that visitation be increased to the stan-
dard level, the statutory presumption that the standard order is reasonable
and in the child's best interest worked in his favor until rebutted. 116 How-
ever, record evidence that the father drank in the presence of the child, be-
came violent when drinking, and kept a vicious pit bull dog, was sufficient to
rebut the presumption and sustain the trial court's ruling. 117
The past year has seen at least two cases involving some sort of successful
recourse against state agencies or professionals by parents accused of child
abuse, as well as at least one failed attempt. In Black v. Dallas County Child
Welfare Unit," 18 the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that a mother accused of
child abuse could recover over $53,000 in costs from a state agency that
acted "frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation."" 9 This was a
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
105. 831 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
106. Id. at 604.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 606.
109. Id.
110. 829 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
111. Id. at 377-78.
112. 820 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
113. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.033(k) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
114. Prause, 820 S.W.2d at 387.
115. Accord Editors Note, 92-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 22 (John J. Sampson ed.
1992).
116. Prause, 820 S.W.2d at 388 (Grant, J., concurring).
117. Id.




case of first impression 20 under chapter 105 of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code, 121 providing remedies for costs incurred in defending
against frivolous claims by state agencies.
In Black, a teacher of a four-year-old handicapped girl reported signs of
possible sexual abuse to the Dallas County Welfare Unit of the Texas De-
partment of Human Services. A probationary caseworker interviewed the
child and her brother, then made a decision to take both children into cus-
tody. 122 The recital of facts in the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Supreme Court of Texas vary substantially in flavor. Nonetheless, it appears
that a judge refused to issue an ex parte temporary possession order, com-
menting that the evidence did not indicate any immediate danger. 23 The
Department kept custody of the children over the weekend and obtained a
hearing before a master on Monday, who granted the Department's re-
quest.' 24 At an evidentiary hearing nine days later, however, the master
found no evidence of abuse and ruled for Mrs. Black.' 25 Nonetheless, the
Department continued to keep the children for another day, requesting a
trial de novo from the district judge. 126
Mrs. Black counterclaimed and, after a bench trial, obtained judgment for
her expenses under Chapter 105. The court's ruling was that, while the De-
partment did not act frivolously when it removed the children from their
home, it did act frivolously from the day the judge first denied the ex parte
order until the termination of the proceedings. 27 The Texas Supreme Court
split five-to-four. The principal dispute involved the interpretation of lan-
guage in Chapter 105 providing for assessment of costs when "the court
finds that the action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."'128
While the dissenting opinion argued that this language required a finding
that the Department's lawsuit be frivolous when filed, 129 the majority con-
sidered that the lawsuit became frivolous once the trial court denied the orig-
inal ex parte request.' 3 0
Put differently, state agencies apparently now have a duty to reevaluate
suits as events develop, and to cease prosecution once further pursuit of a
case might be viewed as "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation."
Whether this reasoning ultimately will carry over into sanctions assessed
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act13 ' or Rule 13132 is open to
120. Id. at 630.
121. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 105.001-04 (Vernon 1986).
122. Black, 835 S.W.2d at 627-28.




127. Id. at 630 n.9.
128. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(1) (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 631 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
130. Black, 835 S.W.2d at 630.
131. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 1987).
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. The ruling in Black is similar to the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987), that "the inquiry [into
the factual and legal bases of pleadings] required by [federal] rule 1 is not a one time only
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question; the dissent "suppose[s] the same rule would apply in other con-
texts' 133 while the majority disclaims any intended effect beyond Chapter
105 actions. 134
For Houston lawyers involved in suits against professionals who diagnose
or report cases of child abuse, 1992 was an interesting-and somewhat con-
fusing-year. In W. C. W. v. Bird 135 a parent accused of child abuse was
given a green light from the Houston court of appeals (1st District) to use
the common law remedy of a suit for "negligent misdiagnosis" against a
psychologist who testified against him. However, in Vineyard v. Kraft,136
under somewhat similar circumstances, the Houston court of appeals (14th
District) denied recovery.
In Bird, the managing conservator father was about to move the child to
Florida when the mother filed criminal charges alleging sexual abuse. The
mother took the child to psychologist Bird for counseling. According to the
summary judgment evidence, this was Bird's first sexual abuse case. 137
Nonetheless, she spent a total of only ten minutes with the child, during
which time she asked no specific questions and conducted no tests. Since the
child was staying temporarily with the mother's family at the time, the psy-
chologist's suspicions of abuse by "Daddy" could have referred either to the
father or to the mother's new common-law husband. 138 Nonetheless, the
psychologist filed an affidavit in the custody action stating that the child was
a victim of sexual abuse by his father and had a conversation with the inves-
tigating officer, resulting in the filing of criminal charges against the fa-
ther. 139 After a successful termination of the proceedings, the father sued
Bird. The trial court granted summary judgment.
In Vineyard, while the facts as stated by the court of appeals are perhaps
less compelling, the story is much the same. Dr. Kraft initially was ap-
pointed by the court to evaluate the father and mother in connection with a
divorce proceeding. 14° The mother took her young daughter to Dr. Kraft
for psychiatric treatment; Dr. Kraft eventually recommended that Mr. Vine-
yard not be the primary caretaker. 14 1 Some time after the divorce, con-
vinced that Mr. Vineyard was abusing his daughter, his former wife violated
court orders and went into hiding in Minnesota. 142 Mr. Vineyard then sued
Dr. Kraft. Again, the trial court granted summary judgment.
Under Family Code chapter 34, those who report child abuse generally
obligation. Counsel have a continuing obligation to review and reevaluate their position as the
case develops." Id. at 1127.
133. Black, 835 S.W.2d at 634.
134. Black, 835 S.W.2d at 629 n.5 (citing the "distinct policy considerations" involved in
Chapter 105).
135. 840 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
136. 828 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
137. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 52.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 828 S.W.2d at 249.




are immune from liability, including liability for testimony in judicial pro-
ceedings. 143 In Vineyard, Dr. Kraft made a report pursuant to chapter 34.
Accordingly, the Houston court of appeals (14th District) held that this im-
munity extended to all statements made in connection with judicial proceed-
ings.'" In Bird, by contrast, chapter 34 was not mentioned until oral
argument in the court of appeals, and thus could not support a summary
judgment. 145
Ms. Bird did make an argument not raised in Vineyard, to the effect that
she should benefit from the common law immunity accorded to participants
in judicial proceedings. 146 Relying on James v. Brown, 14 7 the Houston court
of appeals [First District] held that this privilege extends to suits for defama-
tion, but "does not preclude a suit for negligence."'' 48
One aspect of Bird, however, does seem to present a clear conflict with
Vineyard. In both decisions, the courts of appeals recognized that a tricky
question of duty is presented when one parent brings a child to a health care
professional and a negligent diagnosis results in harm to the other parent.
Both courts turned to the Supreme Court of Texas' "balancing" analysis in
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark. 149 In Vineyard, the court of appeals placed
great weight upon public concern with sexual abuse, expressed in part
through reporting statutes such as section 34.03, and upon the legislative
remedies for improper reporting. 150 The court concluded that these factors
outweighed the possible harm to family relationships caused by not provid-
ing a common law remedy. 151 In Bird, by contrast, the court made no ap-
parent attempt to factor in the social interest, possibly because no formal
chapter 34 report was made.152
143. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
144. Id. at 254.
145. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 53.
146. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no
writ); Kruegel v. Murphy, 126 S.W. 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1910, writ ref'd).
147. 637 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982).
148. This aspect of the court of appeals' holding is perhaps not as clear as it might be. In
James v. Brown, relied upon by the court, a mental patient initially hospitalized for observation
was allowed to sue for negligent misdiagnosis and false imprisonment even though the psychia-
trists' findings were later communicated to a court. 637 S.W.2d at 917-18. This ruling is not
unreasonable, since the patient would have suffered confinement in a mental institution as a
result of the alleged misdiagnosis, with resulting harm, even had the doctors never communi-
cated their findings to a court in a commitment proceeding. In cases in which a pleading of
"negligence" could be said to be a way of artfully avoiding the immunity defense, however,
Texas courts have barred claims sounding in negligence. See, e.g., Clark v. Grigson, 579
S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Bird, the psychologist
apparently was contacted as part of a coordinated effort by the mother to stop the father from
taking the child to Florida. See Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 51.
149. 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983) (discussing, in the context of determining whether a
"duty" is owed, "the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood off injury weighed against the social
utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and
consequences of placing that burden on the employer"); see Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 55 (discussing
Otis Engineering); Vineyard, 828 S.W.2d at 253(same).
150. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.031 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
151. Vineyard, 828 S.W.2d at 253-54.
152. Bird, 840 S.W.2d at 54-56.
1528 [Vol. 46
PARENT AND CHILD
Cheatham v. Rogers,153 a discovery mandamus proceeding, deserves brief
mention, if only as another recent example of applying the maxim "the best
defense is a good offense," when dealing with an unfriendly mental health
professional. Mr. Cheatham was faced with a court-appointed counselor's
report recommending that his rights of access be terminated, and with his
former wife's motion seeking to implement that recommendation. He re-
sponded by noticing the counselor's deposition, accompanying the notice
with a subpoena duces tecum requesting all records relating to the coun-
selor's mental health. 154 The counselor claimed a privilege under Rule
510(b).155 The trial court agreed and quashed the deposition.
The Tyler court of appeals reversed. The court reasoned that the rule's
exception for situations "[w]hen the disclosure is relevant in any suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship" applied' 56 and that the information was
relevant because, "if the information sought shows that [the counselor's]
opinion comes from one who is impaired mentally or emotionally, she would
be effectively impeached by such evidence."' 157 The Cheatham court's rea-
soning was followed by the Houston court of appeals (1st District) in hold-
ing that mental health records of a "close friend" of the wife were likewise
subject to an exception to the mental health privilege, though not relevant in
the particular case.' 58 And, in a letter opinion reciting facts suspiciously
similar to those in the Houston case, the Attorney General's office declined
to address the issue, stating that "[tihe Opinion Committee will not issue an
opinion that effectively overrules a judicial decision."' 59
Finally, in McDonald v. McDonald, 160 the Houston court of appeals (14th
District) dealt with a split custody question. In a custody modification pro-
ceeding, in which both parents sought sole managing conservatorship, the
jury decided that the mother should be the sole managing conservator of her
nine-year-old daughter. The evidence, as characterized by the court of ap-
peals, "presented the jury with a difficult choice between two loving par-
ents."' 16 On appeal, the father argued that, since his sixteen-year-old son
was living with him, the mother should be required to show "clear and com-
pelling"'162 reasons for split custody. Noting that this requirement is not
found in the Family Code, however, the court of appeals opined that the
advantages of keeping children together was only one factor going into the
153. Cheatham v. Rogers, 824 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992) (orig. proceeding).
154. Id. at 232-33.
155. Rule 510(b) provides in relevant parts that "[c]ommunication between a patient and a
professional is confidential and shall not be disclosed" and that "[r]ecords ... which are cre-
ated by a professional are confidential and shall not be disclosed ....... TEX. R. EVID.
510(b)(1), (2).
156. Cheatham, 824 S.W.2d at 234 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 510(d)(6)).
157. Id. at 233.
158. Smith v. Gayle, 834 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Houston (Ist Dist.] 1992, no writ).
159. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. 92-39 (1992).
160. 821 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
161. Id. at 463.
162. This standard is often used by Texas courts when considering the splitting of custody.




calculus of the child's "best interests." The MacDonald court observed that,
since the son had elected to live with his father,163 application of a "clear
and compelling" standard in this case would force parents to contest such
elections or risk losing other children. 164
III. SUPPORT
If the legislatively-mandated child support guidelines were designed to
eliminate courtroom wrangling, they have not yet succeeded fully in this
goal. Two recent cases, Ikard v. Ikard165 and Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,'66
have come to conflicting results on the determination of child support at the
upper end of the income spectrum; the Texas Supreme Court has granted an
application for writ of error in Rodriguez, the more recent of the two.' 67
The principal issue facing the Texas Supreme Court in Rodriguez is
whether "lifestyle" factors can be taken into account when the child support
obligor's net monthly income exceeds $4000, or whether additional support
at this level is limited to a child's demonstrated needs. Before 1989, this
question would not have arisen: The 1987 statutory guidelines specifically
included lifestyle as a factor to be considered by a court when the obligor's
income exceeded $4000 per month.' 68 In a 1989 legislative revision, how-
ever, the reference to lifestyle was deleted. 169 While this might seem to indi-
cate the legislature's intent to eliminate lifestyle factors from child support at
the upper end of the income scale, and the majority of the Rodriguez court of
appeals panel so held, 170 the situation is not quite that simple. Even after
the 1989 amendments, the Texas child support statutes still provide that the
guidelines are only applied "presumptively"' 17 1 and that, whether following
or deviating from the guidelines, courts may consider among other factors
"the ability of the parents to contribute to the support of the child."' 172 In
addition, the statutes set out a number of relevant "evidentiary factors,"' 173
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon Supp. 1993)
164. MacDonald, 821 S.W.2d at 463.
165. 819 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
166. 834 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ granted).
167. The application for writ of error was granted November 4, 1992. Oral argument is set
for February 9, 1993. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 139 (Nov. 4, 1992).
168. The 1987 guidelines stated that "[i]n situations in which the obligor's net resources
exceed $4,000 per month, the court should apply the percentage guidelines ...to the first
$4,000 of the obligor's net resources, and, without further reference to the percentage recom-
mended by these guidelines, may order additional amounts of child support as are appropriate,
depending on the lifestyle of the family, the income of the parties, and the needs of the par-
ties." Act of Nov. 1, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 73, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 226-27,
amended by Act of Sep. 1, 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 617, § 5, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 2035.
169. The current version of the relevant portion of section 14.055 states that the guidelines
apply presumptively to the first $4000 of monthly net resources, and that, "[w]ithout further
reference to the percentage recommended by these guidelines, the court may order additional
amounts of child support as proven, depending on the needs of the child at the time of the
order." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.055(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
170. 834 S.W.2d at 373.
171. Id.
172. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.052(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
173. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.054 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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including the catch-all phrase, "any other reason or reasons consistent with
the best interest of the child, taking into consideration the circumstances of
the parents."1 74 Either one of these more general provisions would seem to
leave ample room for consideration of "lifestyle" factors.
Ikard and Rodriguez offer two conflicting answers to this statutory conun-
drum. In Ikard, the El Paso court of appeals approved an award of $2,840
in child support for two children, based on net monthly resources of at least
$14,000 available to the father, a prominent Austin attorney.' 75 The court
noted the revised statutory language in section 14.055(c) addressing net
monthly resources in excess of $4,000, that is, the amendment eliminating
"lifestyle," but placed more reliance on the general statutory provisions. 17 6
In Rodriguez, by contrast, the court of appeals disapproved an award of
$2500 per month, based on net monthly resources of $8900, reducing the
total to the $1742.17 shown on the former wife's itemized list of the child's
expenses. 177 The Rodriguez court relied upon rules of statutory construc-
tion, reasoning that the specific language of section 14.055(c) controlled
more general provisions, 7 8 and that the Legislature's deletion of the "lifes-
tyle" language from section 14.055(c) in 1989 should be presumed to be de-
liberate.' 79 A dissenting opinion, however, mirrors the El Paso court's
reasoning in Ikard. 180
The language of the El Paso court's decision in Ikard unmistakably ap-
proves consideration of lifestyle factors in determining child support obliga-
tions in the $4000-plus statutory range.' 8 ' Apart from its statutory analysis,
however, the court cited only cases decided before the statutory guidelines
went into effect' 82 or under the pre-1989 version of the statute, 8 3 a fact the
San Antonio court specifically pointed out in reasoning to its contrary con-
clusion in Rodriguez.'8 4 Ikard might also be distinguished factually from
Rodriguez. The trial court in Ikard filed written findings of fact tracking the
current statutory language, that is to say, that the child support award at-
tributable to the obligor's net monthly resources in excess of $4000 was
"based upon the demonstrated needs of the children."' 8 5
The reasoning of the Rodriguez majority, however, might also be ques-
174. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.054(15) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
175. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d at 646. The El Paso court reached a similar result in Belcher v.
Belcher, 808 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ), another case not appealed to the
Texas Supreme Court.
176. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d at 647.
177. 834 S.W.2d at 372.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 373.
180. Id. at 373 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
181. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d at 650.
182. The Ikard court relied upon Sohocki v. Sohocki, 730 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ), a case which predates the statutory guidelines. See Ikard, 819 S.W.2d
at 650.
183. The Ikard court also relied upon Anderson v. Anderson, 770 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ), see Ikard, 819 S.W.2d at 650, a case decided under the 1987 version of
the support guidelines. See Anderson, 770 S.W.2d at 94-95.
184. 834 S.W.2d at 373.
185. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d at 646.
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tioned. The opinion, for example, never deals directly with the "presump-
tive" language of section 14.055(c), which might authorize a larger
percentage of net monthly resources below $4000 even if the statute's word-
ing now precludes any "lifestyle" considerations beyond that point. Nor
does the opinion offer any reason of sound public policy that might have
prompted the Texas Legislature to permit lifestyle considerations, but only
up to a $4,000 net monthly resources "cap." To the contrary, it would seem
that the richer the obligor, the more appropriate and less burdensome it
would be for lifestyle considerations to play a part.
In fact, the only public policy consideration advanced by the San Antonio
court in Rodriguez is the old alimony bugaboo: If amounts tied to the child's
lifestyle, not needs, are considered, then-to the Rodriguez court-this
"would amount to de facto alimony,"' 8 6 something supposedly forbidden in
this state since 1841.187 It may well be true that it is impossible to maintain
a child's former lifestyle without in some respects maintaining the former
lifestyle of the custodial parent,' 8 8 and the dissenting opinion in Rodriguez
could be read as countenancing alimony-like uses of the increased child sup-
port. 189 Nonetheless, this would seem to be an equally valid objection to
lifestyle considerations for determining child support for obligors in the
lower income brackets, and it would be an odd legislative policy indeed
which forbids "de facto alimony" only for the rich. In addition, since one of
the evidentiary factors which a court may consider is "the amount of ali-
mony or spousal maintenance actually and currently being paid or received
by a part,"1 90 then the lack of any alimony or spousal maintenance ought
also to play some role in child support. Whatever one's view on these ques-
tions, some answer from the Texas Supreme Court would be welcome. 19 1
Texas courts also have addressed a potpourri of other issues involving the
setting or modification of support during the past year. In Salazar v. Attor-
186. 834 S.W.2d at 372.
187. In a forthcoming article, this author suggests that the supposed "public policy"
prohibiting court-ordered permanent alimony in Texas since 1841, see Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d
at 372, is neither rooted in the early days of Texas history nor grounded in any deliberate
"public policy." See James W. Paulsen, The Unique Texas Ban on Permanent Alimony and the
Development of Community Property Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1993).
188. In her comment on the Ikard opinion, Cheryl Wilson succinctly spells out the di-
lemma: "Setting child support for high income earners is a vexing problem. At what point
does it become 'mother' support? On the other hand, why shouldn't the children enjoy the
benefits of father's comfortable income?" 92-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 33 (John
Sampson ed. 1992) (comment by Cheryl Wilson).
189. Justice Garcia's opinion seems to intimate that some of the child support could appro-
priately be used for skills training for the custodial parent, or for relocation. Rodriguez, 834
S.W.2d at 378 (Garcia, J., dissenting).
190. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.054(6) (Vernon Supp. 1993). This reference is presuma-
bly to contractual or temporary alimony, or to alimony or spousal maintenance ordered pursu-
ant to a divorce decree rendered in another state, since Texas courts consider court-ordered
permanent alimony to be contrary to the state's public policy.
191. Accord Norma L. Trusch, Child Support-When the Guidelines Don't Fit, STATE BAR
OF TEXAS PROF. DEV. PROGRAM, 3 ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE GGG, GGG-8
(1992) ("Since the Rodgiguez and Ikard cases are in direct conflict ... it would be hoped that
the Supreme Court will resolve this issue. I am not aware of any legislation that will be pro-
posed at the next session to clarify this apparent ambiguity in the code.").
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ney General of Texas192 a paternity action, the Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals ruled that a court need not consider a father's other children in setting
support, when those children were not the subject of a support order. In
Payne v. Dial'93 however, a motion for modification of support based on
changed circumstances was denied although a second child-born before
rendition of the first support order-became subject to a court support order
by the time of the modification motion. And, in State v. Johnican194 a pater-
nity action, the Houston court of appeals (14th District) approved reim-
bursement of child support retroactive to the child's birth. While the
Attorney General's office ordinarily is entitled to reimbursement for all sup-
port, without qualifications, 19 Family Code section 13.42(a) provides for
support in paternity cases retroactive only "to the time of the filing of the
suit."' 196 The Houston court chose not to interpret the latter provision as
restricting the State's rights, because to do so would create an unconstitu-
tional discrimination between children born in and out of wedlock. 197
Contractual agreements for child support have also been the subject of
considerable judicial discussion of late. These agreements generally are en-
forceable in Texas, even in the face of court-ordered reductions in sup-
port. 198 In Hill v. Hill199 though, the Dallas court of appeals faced what is
arguably the converse situation. The former wife sought an increase in child
support beyond the amount specified in a contractual support agreement.
The obligor objected, pointing to authority limiting reductions in child sup-
port to a contractual "floor" and arguing that if it's "good for the goose, it's
good for the gander. '' 2°° The trial court agreed. The Dallas court of ap-
peals, however, reversed, reminding the trial court that its primary concern
should be "neither the goose nor the gander but ... the goslings."'20 1 Since
the court's primary concern is the best interest of the children, "the parties
may agree to do more than the court would require to provide for the best
interest of the children, but they cannot agree to do less."' 20 2 Shortly after
the Dallas court's decision in Hill, the Beaumont court of appeals in Pettit v.
Pettit2°3 summarized conflicts in authority, but decided to follow the Hill
reasoning. And in Leonard v. Lane,204 though not citing Hill, the Houston
court of appeals (1st District) reached a similar result in a breach of contract
case. While the former wife had agreed by contract not to seek an increase
of child support, this provision was held void as against public policy, since
"parties cannot by contract deprive the court of its power to guard the best
192. 827 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
193. 831 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
194. 830 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
195. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.062 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
196. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
197. Johnican, 830 S.W.2d at 216-17.
198. See, e.g., Ruhe v. Rowland, 706 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
199. 819 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
200. Id. at 571.
201. Id. at 572.
202. Id.
203. 818 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no writ).
204. 821 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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interest of the child." '205
The Texas Supreme Court has taken up a more complex version of the
contractual child support question in Williams v. Patton.206 Williams, the
obligor, was badly in arrears on child support. His former wife, Patton, filed
a motion for contempt. The parties then arrived at an agreement whereby
Williams would pay part of the amount in arrears and increased support
payments in the future. The agreement also released Williams from his obli-
gation for arrearages and provided that the contempt action would be dis-
missed with prejudice. The contempt motion was in fact dismissed, but
without prejudice.207 A year and a half later, when Williams stopped mak-
ing child support payments, Patton brought a new contempt motion, seeking
all arrearages, including those encompassed by the agreement. Williams de-
fended, claiming breach of contract.
All parties agreed that future child support payments could not be modi-
fied except by court order.208 The question was whether parents had the
authority to modify payment of past due amounts, arrearages being consid-
ered to be amounts due to the custodial parent, who presumably already has
spent the money for the child. 2°9 The majority of the Texas Supreme Court,
however, held that the trial court's authority to render judgments for past-
due child support payments 210 could not be abrogated by private agreements
between parties.211 The majority's principal concern was that if agreements
for payment of arrearages could be upheld, then non-custodial parents could
refuse to pay support and use the custodial parent's financial difficulties to
"negotiate" an agreed reduction in arrearages. 212 The majority, however,
also held that the parents could agree to reduce arrearages paid by contract,
but only after judgment. 213
The real holding of Williams, then, relates only to timing. The parties
could have had a perfectly enforceable agreement to reduce arrearages owed,
or to pay those arrearages over time, had they waited until after the trial
court entered a judgment. The dissent criticizes this result as imposing an
"unnecessary, time-consuming, and expensive procedure on parents reason-
ably desiring to compromise a debt for child support arrearages, with little
or no corresponding benefit to themselves, their offspring or society. '214
While not responding to this argument in detail, the majority appeared to
feel that retaining some involvement of the trial judge in the process would
at least reduce the possibility that undue financial pressure would be exerted
205. Id. at 278.
206. 521 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1991).
207. Id. at 142 n.2.
208. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(a) (Vernon 1986)(modification of child support
payments requires trial court approval); Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 143.
209. This is the position taken by the Williams dissent. See Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 153
(Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
210. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
211. Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 143.
212. Id. at 144.
213. Id. at 145.
214. Id. at 152 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
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on the custodial parent.215
Legal niceties aside, Williams stands as one of many recent illustrations of
the deep professional divisions between some members of the court.216 The
decision generated a three-judge majority, three judges participating in two
concurring opinions and a three-judge dissent. The dissent criticized the
majority's holding as "but another example of judicially imposed make-work
for the bench and bar" 217 and quoted a family law commentator's observa-
tion: "Isn't this case silly?"'2 18 The majority's acerbic response: "This court
does not view any case involving the protection of a child's best interests as
'silly.' ",219
On a more mundane level, the past year, as usual, generated a respectable
amount of litigation on the enforcement of child support obligations, empha-
sizing the necessity of complying strictly with all constitutional and statu-
tory requisites. In Ex Parte Sproul1220 the Texas Supreme Court reversed a
sentence of more than twenty-two years' confinement for failure to pay child
support because Sproull was not informed of his right to a jury trial.221 In
Ex Parte Alford222 the Houston court of appeals (1st District) ruled that a
commitment order which set out only the total amount of child support ar-
rearages was void, reiterating the statutory requirement 223 that such an or-
der set out specifically the time, date and occasion of each failure to
comply. 224 In Ex Parte Stanley225 the Dallas court of appeals voided a con-
tempt order that referred to the underlying divorce decree and support obli-
gations by reference to wrong volume of the court minutes. In Ex Parte
Garcia226 the El Paso court of appeals held that a "fill-in-the-blank" con-
tempt order which did not specify the person to whom the obligor was to
pay the arrearages was fatally defective. And in the Interest of Dickinson227
the Amarillo court of appeals held that the fact that a court order for arrear-
ages extended the final payment date beyond the youngest child's eighteenth
birthday did not extend the statute of limitations for bringing a contempt
215. See Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 144.
216. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Refining & Mktg. v. Mendez, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 450
(Jan. 5, 1993) (Cornyn, J., concurring on rehearing) (characterizing a dissenting opinion as
representing "another example of an unfortunate tendency toward intolerance for honest dif-
ferences of legal opinion on this court").
217. Id. at 152 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 154 (quoting David N. Gray, 91-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 27 (John
Sampson ed. 1991)). The reference is to the court of appeals opinion, identical in relevant
respects to the Texas Supreme Court's majority opinion.
219. Williams, 821 S.W.2d at 145. Justice Doggett's concurrence also criticizes the dissent
for an "unnatural injection of natural law" and suggests that, "[t]aken to an extreme, this view
would permit a free market in baby-selling." Id. at 147 n.4 (Doggett, J., concurring).
220. 815 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).
221. A possible sentence of more than six months' confinement has been held to be "seri-
ous" contempt, giving rise to a right to jury trial. See, e.g., Ex Parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542,
546-47 (Tex. 1976).
222. 827 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
223. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.33(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
224. 827 S.W.2d at 74.
225. 826 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
226. Ex Parte Garcia, 831 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding).




The Texarkana court of appeals has issued an interesting opinion in a
criminal case. In Lyons v. State229 a probated sentence for criminal nonsup-
port2 30 was challenged on the ground that the statute violates the Texas
Constitution's prohibition on imprisonment for debt. 231 The court rejected
the contention, concluding that "[i]mprisonment assessed as punishment for
the violation of a statute or court order is not imprisonment for debt, even if
the statute or court order has the effect of requiring a payment of money. '232
A concurring opinion noted that this case, while apparently the first address-
ing the constitutionality of the criminal statute, is in line with similar rulings
in civil contempt cases. 233
Since a 1983 amendment to the Texas Constitution, a potent weapon-
garnishment-has been added to the court's arsenal of options to ensure
payment of child support. That amendment specifically authorizes garnish-
ment of current wages "for the enforcement of court-ordered child support
payments. ' 234 In Tamez v. Tamez,235 the obligor challenged court-ordered
wage withholding because the amounts withheld went not only to pay child
support, but attorneys' fees, repayment of funds spent on the childrens'
needs by his ex-spouse before divorce, and compensation for the commu-
nity's interest in retirement benefits. The Corpus Christi court of appeals
disapproved withholding for retirement benefits or for pre-divorce spending
for child support (these funds were not "court-ordered" 236), but approved
withholding for attorneys' fees as "incidental to" the court-ordered child
support obligation.2 37 Attorney General's Office v. Mitchell238 raised a statu-
tory question related to court-ordered wage withholding. A child support
obligor challenged the withholding of support from paychecks, some ten
months after withholding began, claiming that the amount of arrearages was
incorrect and that the Attorney General's office failed to give proper notice.
The trial court ordered the return of all funds paid under the withholding
arrangement and further ordered the Attorney General's office to pay all
costs and attorneys fees. 2 39 The Dallas court of appeals ruled that Mitchell's
228. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(b) (Vernon 1986) provides that the court's jurisdic-
tion to enter contempt orders extends for six months after the child becomes an adult or six
months after "the date on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree
or order or by operation of law." The custodial spouse argued that the court order for pay-
ment of arrears fell within the latter provision; the court of appeals reasoned that, support
orders extend beyond a child's eighteenth birthday only if the child was enrolled in high school
or was disabled, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.0(a), (b) (Vernon 1986), and that the child
did not fall in either of these two categories. Dickinson, 829 S.W.2d at 921.
229. 835 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, pet refd).
230. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (Vernon 1989).
231. TEX. CONST. art I, § 18.
232. Id. at 718.
233. Id. at 719 (Grant, J., concurring).
234. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (1876, amended 1983).
235. 822 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
236. Id. at 690.
237. Id. at 691.
238. 819 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
239. Id. at 557-58.
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failure to challenge any impropriety within ten days after notice, 24° or within
thirty days after the effective date of the writ,2 4 1 barred his complaints.
242
Finally, two recent decisions relating to the way in which payment of
child support can be insured deserve mention. In Kolpack v. Torres243 the
Corpus Christi court of appeals disapproved a trial court's decision to hold
the trustee of a discretionary trust directly liable for payment of child sup-
port, absent an underlying judgment against the trust beneficiary. The trial
court found, through separate sets of calculations, the amounts the benefici-
ary/obligor would receive from trust distributions and other income. The
trustee was ordered to pay its "share" under the child support guidelines; the
obligor spouse was separately ordered to pay his. The Corpus Christi court
reasoned that, since Family Code section 14.05(c) empowers a court to order
trustees to make distributions for child support only "to the extent the trust-
ees are required to make payments to a beneficiary who is required to make
support payments,"' 2 " an underlying support judgment against the obligor is
required.245
The second case, Baucom v. Crews,246 involved a motion to modify child
support to capture part of a lump-sum severance payment. Beecher Baucom
received a $60,000-plus lump-sum payment from his railroad job when he
decided to quit. By his own testimony, he tried to conceal this and other
payments from his ex-spouse and the court. 247 He was also $1800 in arrears
on support payments. 248 In deciding to award lump-sum support, the Waco
court of appeals addressed what it thought was a question of first impres-
sion 249 under the post-1989 version of Family Code section 14.05(a). 250
Since the 1989 legislative session, the Family Code requires lump-sum
awards to be justified "for good cause shown."' 251 Despite the fact that there
was no specific fact finding on good cause, the Waco court of appeals found
sufficient "good cause" in the fact of the lump-sum payments, the obligor's
arrears, his voluntary underemployment and his concealment of pay-
ments.252 The Baucom court's legal reasoning on this point has been criti-
cized as "mumbo jumbo and a prime example of a court deciding what
should happen and then . . .rationaliz[ing] its decision, '253 because the
needs of the child did not appear to play a role. The same commentator
240. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
241. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(e) (Vernon 1993).
242. Mitchell, 819 S.W.2d at 559.
243. 829 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
244. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(c) (Vernon 1986).
245. Kolpack, 829 S.W.2d at 916.
246. 819 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ).
247. Baucom, 819 S.W.2d at 631.
248. Id. at 629.
249. In actuality, the Austin court of appeals had addressed the issue about two and one-
half months earlier in Kahn v. Kahn, 813 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ),
arriving at an arguably contrary result. See 92-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 29 (John
Sampson ed. 1992).
250. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
251. Id.
252. Baucom, 819 S.W.2d at 630-31.
253. David N. Gray, 92-1 STATE BAR SEC. REP.-FAM. L. 29 (John Sampson ed. 1992).
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adds, however: "In this case that isn't so bad."'254
IV. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
In 1987, the Texas Legislature gave specific authority for the termination
of parental rights when the parent is found, by reason of mental illness, to be
unable to care for the child.25 5 In the Interest of CarrolP256 presented a con-
stitutional challenge to this statute by a parent who became mentally ill
before enactment of the statute. The Tyler court of appeals upheld the law's
validity. The court observed that the state has a legitimate interest in sin-
gling out the class of mentally ill persons for special treatment, so far as the
welfare of children is concerned. 257 Since the statute requires "clear and
convincing" evidence, in accord with United States Supreme Court stan-
dards, 258 due process and due course rights are not violated. The court dis-
missed the mother's argument that the statute was unconstitutionally
retroactive with the observation that the mother remained mentally ill for a
year before the state filed suit.259
In LaRue v. LaRue260 the Tyler court of appeals ruled that one conse-
quence of agreeing to voluntary termination of parental rights with no fur-
ther notice of judicial proceedings is to estop the other parent from seeking
child support arrearages at a later date, even if the termination of rights is
never effectuated. In Swinney v. Mosher261 however, an action by prospec-
tive adoptive parents against a birth mother who backed out of a deal, the
Fort Worth court of appeals held that the mother's signature on an affidavit
voluntarily relinquishing parental rights should not be construed as evidence
of abandonment.
Standing questions have also played a role in termination proceedings. In
Rodarte v. Cox 262 the Tyler court of appeals held that foster parents of two
and one-half years' duration had standing to seek termination of parental
rights, upholding the statute263 against a variety of constitutional challenges.
And, in Ray v. Burns264 the Waco court of appeals held a mother's failure to
object to the standing of non-parents in a termination proceeding was fatal
to any complaint.
Several decisions regarding the inheritance rights of adopted children have
issued recently, with courts holding that adopted children are entitled to
254. Id.
255. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.024 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
256. 819 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ).
257. Id. at 592.
258. Id. at 593; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 (1980); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.024 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
259. 819 S.W.2d at 593.
260. 832 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
261. 830 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
262. 828 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, writ pending).
263. The Texas Family Code provides, inter alia, that a termination suit can be brought by
an "adult whom the court determines to have had substantial past contact with the child
sufficient to warrant standing to do so." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03(d)(4) (Vernon 1986).
264. 832 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
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inherit from birth parents265 or later born half-siblings. 266 In Curry v. Willi-
man,267 the Dallas court of appeals dealt with an interesting variation on the
general rules, applying settled law to permit a child's natural mother to in-
herit, despite an appealing contrary claim of equitable adoption. Stacy
Curry was born severely retarded, due to the hospital's negligence at birth.
Stacy's parents divorced when she was two years old; her natural mother
had no further contact for twenty years.268 Stacy's father remarried and had
three children by the second marriage. The couple also tried to adopt Stacy,
but abandoned the effort when Stacy's mother opposed it.
After Stacy died, her father and stepmother filed an application for deter-
mination of heirship, requesting that Stacy's estate (the remainder of a
money award for the hospital's negligence) be divided among her half-
brother and half-sisters. 269 Relying on Heien v. Crabtree,270 the Dallas ap-
peals court applied section 40 of the Probate Code27 1 to divide Stacy's estate
between her natural mother and father. The court reasoned that, even if this
situation could be considered one of "equitable adoption," this is a species of
estoppel operating only in favor of the child, not the parents. 272 Since Stacy
broke no promise, her estate was not bound. The court might have added
that, while Heien may not have been the most reasonable reading of section
40, that section has been amended since, with no change in the relevant lan-
guage.27 3 Under long-standing Texas rules of statutory construction, this
signals approval of prior judicial interpretations. 274
265. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Douchette, 817 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1991, writ denied).
266. B.C.S. v. D.A.E., 818 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
267. 834 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
268. Id. at 444.
269. Id.
270. 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
271. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
272. Curry, 834 S.W.2d at 444.
273. See Act of Sept. 1, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 375, § 34, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1485.
274. See, e.g., Patton v. American Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.
1945) (reenactment of a statute after judicial construction implies approval); Hilliard v. Wil-
kerson, 492 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ granted, dism'd agr.)
("[W]here, after a statute has been construed by a state's highest court, the legislature reenacts
the statute, whether by adoption of revised statutes or amendment, the act of the legislature
carries with it the construction previously placed upon the law by the court."). This rule of
construction would seem particularly appropriate in light of the spirited dissent by Justice
Greenhill in Heien, to the effect that the majority was misconstruing the statute. See 369
S.W.2d at 32 (Greenhill, J., dissenting).
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